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Abstract: This study examines the religious-secular party cleavage in German
morality politics from a new perspective by tracing politicization patterns at
the individual level. It builds on the idea of issue competition and explores
whether conflicts between Christian Democrats and secular parties align with
the traditional denominational divide between Catholics and non-Catholics or
with religiosity. By means of logistic regressions of Member of Parliaments’
politicization behavior in the German Bundestag (1998–2002) with regard to
three morality policies, the study provides evidence that German politics is
still structured by a conflict between Catholics and non-Catholics, whereas the
influence of religiosity is secondary. If party competition is at work, non-
Catholics draw attention to morality policies, while Catholics refrain from
doing so. This finding contradicts research pointing to a decreasing
significance of Catholicism for Christian Democracy. Moreover, the study
proposes an innovative way to re-examine party cleavages at the individual
level and in between elections.
Address correspondence and reprint requests to: Eva-Maria Euchner, Geschwister-Scholl-Institut fu¨r
Politikwissenschaften, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität Mu¨nchen, Oettingenstr. 67, DE-80538
Munich, Germany. E-mail: eva-maria.euchner@gsi.lmu.de.
This article is part of the research project MORAPOL (Comparative Analysis of Moral Policy
Change), funded by the European Research Council Advanced Grant (Grant No. 249388) and led
by Professor Christoph Knill (Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität Mu¨nchen). We are very grateful for
the comments from our colleagues of the MORAPOL project, Marc Debus (University of
Mannheim), Christoffer Green-Pedersen (University of Aarhus), Petra Meier (University of
Antwerp), and Mieke Verloo (Radboud University).
221
Politics and Religion, 11 (2018), 221–248
© Religion and Politics Section of the American Political Science Association, 2018
doi:10.1017/S1755048317000694 1755-0483/18
use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1755048317000694
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. UB der LMU München, on 06 Sep 2019 at 07:20:02, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of
INTRODUCTION
The seminal work of Engeli, Green-Pedersen, and Larsen (2012) has high-
lighted the continued importance of the religious-secular party cleavage
for the politicization of morality issues in Western Europe. In contrast
to other scholarship suggesting the decreasing importance of religion in
morality politics (Asal, Sommer, and Harwood 2013; Fink 2008; Knill,
Preidel, and Nebel 2014) and the increasingly “unsecular” approach of
Christian Democrats (Van Kersbergen 2008), Engeli, Green-Pedersen,
and Larsen (2012) argue that the politicization of morality issues —
non-economic issues that provoke value conflicts — is still structured
by the religious-secular cleavage between Christian Democrats and
secular parties. In this study, however, we question the “depth,” so to
speak, of this religious-secular party cleavage in Western Europe and
ask what dynamics and divides actually shape the cleavage today?1 We
raise this question in light of the modernization of Christian Democratic
parties, their increasing departure from Catholic teachings (Clemens
2009; Debus and Mu¨ller 2013), the growing distance between religious
voters and Christian Democratic parties (Elff 2013), and the decreasing
power of traditional cleavages to explain the political behavior of citizens
and political elites (Evans 1999; Kriesi 1998; 2010). More specifically, we
ask whether the cleavage between Christian Democrats and secular parties
still exists in German morality policy and, if so, in what form? Is the
denominational divide between Catholics and non-Catholics originally
proposed by Lipset and Rokkan (1967) still relevant today or do we
find mainly a divide between religious and secular actors in accordance
with transformations in citizens’ voting behavior (Rapp et al. 2014)?
To answer these questions, this study examines the conflict between
individual MPs (Member of Parliaments) vis-à-vis the politicization of
morality issues in the German Bundestag. It asks not only whether a
religious cleavage is, indeed, still present among German elites, but also
what form it takes (i.e., Christian Democratic versus secular parties,
Catholics versus non-Catholics, religious MPs versus non-religious
MPs). Whereas previous scholarship on changing party cleavages exam-
ines citizens’ voting behavior, we follow research on legislative behavior
and issue competition by exploring instead at individual MPs’ initiative
behavior on value-loaded policies.2 In doing so, we investigate which
personal characteristics — i.e., affiliation to the Catholic Church or religi-
osity — unify the parliamentary actors of different conflict coalitions
during the policy initiation and formulation stage. This micro-level
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perspective on parliamentary behavior is very innovative because it
enables us to open the “black box” of political parties, regularly seen as
monolith collective actors, and to explore the actual existence and funda-
ment of religious-secular party cleavages on the ground. Aside from this
innovative methodological approach, the new analytical angle allows us
to evaluate cleavage structures in between elections — a rare insight
that complements existing studies focusing on voting behavior. Not
only religious-secular divides but any other party cleavage proposed by
Lipset and Rokkan (1967) can be re-evaluated in between elections
through this fresh perspective on parliamentary behavior.
Analyzing individual politicization behavior in the German Bundestag
with regard to the regulation of gay marriage, prostitution, and stem cell
research during the 14th legislative term offers a valuable empirical
window onto the complex dynamics of competition among religious
and secular parties in the context of morally-loaded conflicts. The
German party system is seemingly organized by a religious cleavage,
with two Christian Democratic Parties — the Christian Democratic
Union (CDU) and the Christian Social Union (CSU) — competing with
four secular parties. Moreover, the Christian Democratic Union is elector-
ally relatively successful and could well maintain its standing as the most
powerful party in Germany, in contrast to its counterparts in other
European countries (Bale and Krouwel 2013). As such, Germany offers
a strong case for examining our research questions.
Briefly, we find that German party competition on morality policies is
still structured by a religious-secular cleavage, meaning a divide between
Christian Democrats and secular parties. At the micro-level, however, we
observe that it is the conflict between Catholics and non-Catholics, and not
necessarily the conflict between religious and non-religious deputies,
which shapes politicization behavior. In contrast to scholars who argue
that the traditional religious cleavage has lost relevance as Christian
Democrats drift from their Catholic roots, we find that parliamentary
behavior on morality issues continues to be structured by the cleavage
between the Catholic Church and the nation-state as originally conceptu-
alized by Lipset and Rokkan (1967). Specifically, we observe that German
Catholic MPs avoid politicizing morality issues, while non-Catholics
strive to put morality issues on the parliamentary agenda. If party
discipline is relaxed, the divide between Catholics and non-Catholics
still structures parliamentary behavior, but Catholics do not stay passive
but instead engage actively in suggesting restrictive policy solutions.
In short, although Engeli, Green-Pedersen, and Larsen’s (2012) argument
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regarding a religious-secular cleavage finds surface-level support in
Germany, once we look at the micro-level, we find that the divide
between Catholics and non-Catholics better explains individual MPs’
behavior when it comes to the politicization of morality issues.
The article is structured as follows: After introducing the research on
party cleavage structures and morality issues, we outline the theoretical
framework and central expectations, and then explain the research
design. Next, we present and discuss the empirical results regarding the
conflict structures of morality policies. Finally, we conclude with a
summary and discussion of the empirical findings.
THE RELIGIOUS-SECULAR CLEAVAGE ANDMORALITY ISSUES
Morality issues are characterized by value conflicts over “first principles,”
as opposed to issues defined by monetary values. Popular examples are
the regulation of abortion, stem cell research, prostitution, and same-sex
partnerships (Heichel, Knill, and Schmitt 2013; Meier 1994; Mooney
2001). When debating these questions, religious doctrines offer an impor-
tant source of value orientation for political parties and individual MPs.
Thus, it is assumed that morality politics will be organized along religious
lines. As noted above, the work of Engeli, Green-Pedersen, and Larsen
(2012) aims to explain the different levels of politicization of morality
issues in Western Europe, using the existence or non-existence of a reli-
gious-secular party cleavage in a country as the explanatory variable.
By reactivating party cleavage theory in this way, the authors propose a
very innovative framework. In line with the work of Budge and Farlie’s
(1983),3 Engeli, Green-Pedersen, and Larsen (2012) argue that Christian
Democrats and secular parties compete not only in terms of their specific
positions on issues, but also in terms of their emphasis on different issues
during as well as in between elections. Regarding morality politics,
Engeli, Green-Pedersen, and Larsen (2012) propose that increased levels
of issue attention are the product of a religious cleavage between
Christian Democratic and secular parties. All countries that possess a
strong Christian Democratic or church-associated party are part of the
so-called “religious world,” while those countries without strong religious
parties are categorized as part of the “secular world.” In the “religious
world,” morality policy attention is high because secular parties politicize
these issues in order to challenge Christian Democrats and thus, are able to
use morality issues along an issue competition logic.
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Yet empirical studies on morality policies, party position transforma-
tion, Christian Democracy in modern times, and party cleavages in elec-
toral behavior raise the question of whether the conflict between
Christian Democrats and secular parties is still founded on the traditional
religious cleavage between Catholics and non-Catholics (Clemens 2009;
Elff 2013; Kalyvas and Van Kersbergen 2010). Several researchers
argue that Christian Democratic parties, historically grounded on
Catholic teachings, have undergone ideological change in order to
survive in times of secularization and a shrinking Catholic electorate.
Such parties no longer seek to accommodate only Catholics; rather, they
now incorporate and address heterogeneous groups within society and
adopt a more moderate profile vis-à-vis morality issues, such as abortion,
gay marriage, and sexual services (Debus and Mu¨ller 2013; Kalyvas and
Van Kersbergen 2010; Knill, Preidel, and Nebel 2014). These changes
often engender severe struggles within Christian Democratic parties
(Kalyvas and Van Kersbergen 2010). These findings are in line with elec-
toral studies that have discovered a decline of the denominational cleavage
and emphasized instead the multidimensionality of the religious factor
(Kohut 2000). For instance, studies reveal that, despite the reduction of
denominational differences, a religious cleavage still exists that splits
regular church attendees from non-attendees (Van Der Brug, Hobolt,
and de Vreese 2009; Elff 2013; Knutsen 2004). Based on studies that
analyze parliamentary voting behavior on morality issues (Preidel
2016), one could expect to find the same divides not only among the elec-
torate of Christian Democratic parties but also among party members
themselves in parliament.
In sum, all of these factors — the changing nature of modern Christian
Democracy and the non-consideration of the multidimensional character of
religion— highlight the need for work on the relevance and conception of
the religious-secular cleavage in European morality politics today. The
need for clarification increases specifically in the German context when
we look at the religious composition of parliamentary party groups
in the Bundestag, a parliament featuring a typical divide between
Christian Democratic and secular parties. Figure 1 shows how Catholic,
Protestant, and religious MPs were distributed across the different parlia-
mentary party groups for the 14th legislative period (1998–2002). It
reveals that Christian Democrats in fact include the largest proportion of
Catholics (about 70%). Surprisingly, however, only 50% of the “very reli-
gious” MPs are members of Christian Democratic parties, while the other
half are members of secular parties. Even at this descriptive level, then, we
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find evidence against the claim that religiosity now structures the reli-
gious-secular party cleavage; meanwhile, the divide between Catholics
versus non-Catholics is more pronounced, but it too fails to align precisely
with the divide between Christian Democratic and secular parties
The present study tackles these puzzling patterns. By taking a closer
look at the issue competition of German parties on morality policies,
we investigate whether a religious-secular cleavage is still present and,
if so, in which form (i.e., Christian Democratic versus secular parties,
Catholics versus non-Catholics, religious MPs versus non-religious
MPs). In this way, we depart from the traditional approach of analyzing
party cleavages through the analysis of citizens’ voting behavior or the
collective position taking of parliamentary party groups during the
phases of electoral campaigns and decision-making. Instead, we introduce
a new perspective on how to examine the religious-secular party cleavage
in morality politics in the parliamentary arena and pre-decision-making
stages.
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
To examine the question of the existence and foundations of the religious-
secular conflict in German morality policy-making, we integrate Engeli,
Green-Pedersen, and Larsen’s (2012) argument with the idea of issue
competition (Budge and Farlie 1983) and the concept of policy-,
FIGURE 1. Party composition for each religious group in the German Bundestag
(1998–2002). Note: Data source: German Bundestag.
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office-, and vote-seeking (Mu¨ller and Strøm 1999). Based on these theo-
retical approaches, we assume that the salience of morality policy in the
German Bundestag is shaped by a conflict between Christian Democrats
and secular parties.4 At the micro-level, however, the individual (religious)
characteristics and interests of MPs are decisive. According to Coleman
(2000) and the popular “bathtub model,” a micro-foundation is always
necessary to explain macro-level phenomena. As such, the micro-level
perspective employed in this article is an innovative way to explore
party cleavage structures and to test previously proposed macro-level
propositions.5 We propose three theoretical expectations regarding party
and MPs’ individual initiative behavior on morality policies dependent
on three different aspects of religion (i.e., religious versus secular party
membership, Catholicism versus non-Catholicism, religiosity versus
non-religiosity). All hypotheses are based on the common assumption
that the policy status quo displays a restrictive regulation at the starting
point of our examination.
With regard to morality policies, secular political parties are able to
pressure religious political opponents by emphasizing morality issues in
the parliamentary arena by, for example, sponsoring legislative bills.
Such a strategy is successful, according to Engeli, Green-Pedersen, and
Larsen (2012), because morality policies are unattractive to religious
parties given an increasingly secular voter base. This is particularly true
when the religious party seeks to maintain its position as a mass party
(Euchner 2015a). In line with Kalyvas and Van Kersbergen (2010),
Engeli, Green-Pedersen, and Larsen (2012) suggest religious parties
would do best to develop an “unsecular” profile that would enable them
to gain support from (new) non-religious voters, while still preserving
their religious voter base. In this way, Engeli, Green-Pedersen, and
Larsen (2012) indirectly argue that religious parties can integrate
policy-, office-, and vote-seeking strategies by not politicizing morality
issues. More specifically, Christian Democrats can attract new support
without losing their traditional voters; and, at the same time, the restrictive
regulatory status quo of morality policies can be contained. We expect
single Christian Democratic MPs to follow a similar strategic behavior
in terms of morality policies because party discipline is often very
strong and individual MPs also aim to enhance their voter base and
their political career by challenging their opponents and similarly
pushing through their own policy interests (Carey 2009; Kam 2011).
We therefore propose:
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Expectation 1a: If an MP is a member in a political party, which is
relatively large, has strong religious roots, and is confronted with a
secular counterpart, she/he will not politicize morality issues in
parliament.
Expectation 1b: If an MP is a member in a political party, which is
relatively large, has strong secular roots, and is confronted with a
religious counterpart, she/he will politicize morality issues in
parliament.
One might question this logic, both at the macro- and the micro-level.
First, large religious parties such as the Christian Democrats not only
face an increasingly secular voter base, but have also undergone a modern-
ization process in recent years that has produced more progressive policy
preferences in regard to morality issues (Debus and Mu¨ller 2013; Euchner
2015a; Kalyvas and Van Kersbergen 2010). Second, morality politics
have provoked severe value conflicts and, in some cases, divided the
members of religious political parties, resulting in different individual
political strategies (Baumann, Debus, and Mu¨ller 2013; Knill et al.
2015). As such, one can ask whether party competition between religious
and secular parties is still in working order? And if so, what does the reli-
gious fundament look like? Is party competition between these actors still
found on the religiosity of their MPs or does the religious denomination of
MPs drives the behavior of partisan actors?
In line with the literature on morality politics, we expect Catholic MPs
to avoid politicizing morality issues, while non-Catholics seek to put these
issues on the parliamentary agenda. More specifically, MPs without mem-
bership in a religious community— so-called non-affiliated MPs— profit
from the politicization of morality issues because such issues may mobi-
lize new secular voters and align with the MPs’ permissive policy posi-
tions regarding morality policies in public. In addition, we expect
Protestants to behave differently (and in particular less coherently) than
Catholics, as the Catholic Church is organized more hierarchically and for-
mulates more explicitly and uniformly restrictive positions toward moral-
ity policies (Willems 2007). For instance, some Protestant priests in
Germany blessed homosexual couples in the past, although the main rep-
resentative organ of the Protestant Church did not allow it. Moreover, even
before the German Bundestag permitted civil marriage of homosexual
couples in July 2017, the Protestant Church in Rhineland allowed their
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priests to bless same-sex couples. No similar instance is known from any
Catholic diocese in Germany. Therefore, we expect the divide between
Catholics and non-Catholics to be even more clear-cut than that
between Catholics and Protestants or Catholics and non-affiliated MPs.
Consequently, we propose:
Expectation 2a: If an MP is Catholic, he/she will not politicize morality
issues in parliament.
Expectation 2b: If an MP is non-Catholic, he/she will politicize
morality issues in parliament and propose permissive reforms proposals.
Studies on electoral behavior showed that the denominational divide has
decreased, while the divide between Christians regularly attending reli-
gious services and non-attendees has gained salience (Van Der Brug,
Hobolt, and de Vreese 2009; Elff 2013; Knutsen 2004; Rapp et al.
2014). This engagement of Christians in their community, independent
of the denomination with which they are affiliated, captures an additional
dimension of religion, and may stand behind the religious-secular cleavage
at the party level.
We consider MPs who regularly attend church services or are involved
in church-associated organizations to be equally active in parliament.
Because religious community engagement strengthens and conserves reli-
gious beliefs and norms in daily life (Kohut 2000), these MPs are more
likely to act in line with religious values and articulate them openly
than more passive, uninvolved church members. Active religious MPs
may prefer restrictive regulation of morally charged issues and hence, a
protection of the regulatory status quo. In order to promote these interests
and follow their policy-, vote-, and office-seeking aims, such MPs will not
politicize morality issues. Non-religious deputies, by contrast, might polit-
icize morality policies actively in order to appeal to the majority of non-
religious voters, save office, and reflect their own policy preferences.
Therefore, we propose:
Expectation 3a: If an MP is actively engaged in a religious
organization, he/she will not politicize morality issues in parliament.
Expectation 3b: If an MP is not actively engaged in a religious
organization, he/she will politicize morality issues in parliament and
propose permissive reform proposals.
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RESEARCH DESIGN
In order to analyze the foundations of the religious-secular party cleavage
through a fresh, micro-level perspective, the study takes a closer look at
the German Bundestag and the behavior of its members, specifically
their politicization behavior with regard to morality policies. Three fea-
tures make Germany a good case for contrasting the influence of the dif-
ferent facets of religion. First, Germany can be classified as a typical
representative of the religious world. Its Christian Democratic parties
compete with social-liberal parties for political power, thus meeting the
strong requirement for the existence of a religious-secular conflict
and the significant influence of religion on morality politics. Second,
Germany is a country with two strong religious denominations
(Catholicism and Protestantism), allowing for a more multifaceted per-
spective on religion. Third, Germany is an interesting case because
Christian Democratic parties are still very successful compared to their
counterparts in other European countries, where religious parties have
experienced serious electoral defeats (Bale and Krouwel 2013).
The study focuses on three morality policies: gay marriage, prostitution
policy, and embryonic stem cell research. All three issues were discussed
during the 14th legislative term (1998–2002) of the Bundestag and touch
on different value-loaded struggles related to gender, minority rights, self-
determination, and life protection. Moreover, all three issues were regu-
lated with a comparably restrictive approach at that time (Knill et al.
2015). In addition, the issues also differ in terms of how they affect inter-
nal party heterogeneity. While party discipline was in working order for
gay marriage and prostitution policy, it was abandoned in the agenda-
setting process related to embryonic protection policy, as neither the
Christian Democratic nor the secular parties could agree internally on a
common position. Consequently, the policy selection offers a strong test
for exploring the religious fundament of a religious-secular party cleavage.
The study follows a two-fold approach of analysis: First, we conduct a
descriptive assessment of the use of different instruments of issue poli-
ticization (motions and bills) by party. Second, we focus on issue politi-
cization via bills. In detail, we assess whether an MP contributes to
initiate bills on morality issues or intentionally avoids such an initiation
process.6 In addition, we analyze the content of the bills and sort them
according to their regulatory restrictiveness. The categorization of bills
follows other scholars in the field that distinguishes between different
policy paradigms (Euchner 2015b; Fink 2007; Preidel 2015).7 In the
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field of same-sex partnership rights, we differentiate between a regulatory
model of cohabitation and a model of registered partnerships. With regard
to prostitution policy, the policy paradigms of “limited recognition” and
“full recognition” are taken into account. And in the field of embryonic
stem cell research, three different types of bills are distinguished: a
model of prohibition, a model specifying key dates, and a model favoring
an import solution. We use regression analysis to investigate whether
MPs’ politicization behavior still follows the traditional religious divide
between Catholics and non-Catholics. For each policy field, a multinomial
variable is created that covers as categories the different reform proposals
that were posed and the option “none” — with the latter covering the
option of initiating none of the bills. Thus, we created a novel dataset
which includes personal characteristics of MPs as well as the type and
number of initiatives they propose during the 14th legislative period (see
for some descriptive statistics of the dependent and the independent vari-
able Table A1 in the online Appendix).
The personal characteristics concerning individual religious denomina-
tion and engagement are the independent variables. The biographical data
of the MPs, published on the homepage of the German Bundestag, serve
as the data source (Preidel 2016). The first explanatory variable is a
dummy and captures affiliation to a religious party, that is, being
member of the CDU or CSU. The second independent variable covers,
separately, the “religious denomination” of the MP, that is, being
Catholic, Protestant, or unaffiliated. “Religious engagement” is an indica-
tor for individual religiosity, capturing whether the MP is or was in the
past an active member of a Christian organization, for example, by engag-
ing in one of the Catholic organizations Kolpingwerk or Caritas or in the
Protestant organization Diakonie. Different control variables are consid-
ered for modelling the data: being resident of East Germany, age,
gender, and possession of an academic degree. These factors not only con-
found with the religious effects but also determine the party affiliation.
For every policy field, we estimate two separate multinomial logistic
regression models, given the nominal structure of the dependent variables.
Model 1 incorporates the affiliation to a religious party and the controls,
testing the validity of Expectations 1a and 1b. In addition, we control
for the specific party affiliation because, on the one hand, the individual
behavior of deputies in parliamentary systems is characterized by strong
party discipline (Carey 2009); on the other hand, MPs are socialized
through their party affiliation in the long run (Kam 2011). For this
purpose, we estimate clustered standard errors considering the five
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different parliamentary party groups in the German Bundestag: the
Christian Democratic Union (CDU/CSU), the Social Democrats (SPD),
the Liberals (FDP), the Green Party (Bu¨ndnis90/Die Gru¨nen) and the
Left Party (Die Linke).
Model 2 tests the effect of religious denomination and engagement,
covering all individual controls in addition to the two relevant indepen-
dent variables (cf., Expectations 2a and 2b as well as Expectations 3a
and 3b). This second model does not aim to investigate whether political
parties matter, but whether the variables of religious denomination or
religiosity unify politicization coalitions. Considering the crucial role
of parties in forming coalitions in the parliamentary process and social-
izing members, we again estimate clustered standard errors, as in
Model 1.
If we were to integrate party affiliation as a nominal variable, that var-
iable would explain all variation in the case of gay marriage and prostitu-
tion policy and most of the variation with regard to the politicization of
stem cell policy, where party discipline was suspended (Baumann,
Debus, and Mu¨ller 2013). This relationship results not only from mecha-
nisms of party socialization (Kam 2011), but also from the personal deci-
sion to join a specific political party. Empirical studies investigating such
decisions find that individuals choose a party that represents their prefer-
ences for their most salient policy issue (Klein 2006; Laux 2011; Whiteley
et al. 1994). Morality issues represent such topics of high salience because
they touch on first principles and speak to people’s belief system (Mooney
2001). Therefore, we suggest that the decision to join a specific party
follows the same logic as individual policy activity in the political
arena. This proposition is supported by an extra multicollinearity analysis,
which shows that Cramer’s V between party affiliation and individual
politicization in the three fields under study varies on a high level,
among 0.45 and 1.00. Consequently, integrating party affiliation as an
explanatory variable would prevent us from being able to unpack the
“black box” of monolithic political parties. As such, controlling for the
specific party affiliation with clustered standard errors is the most appro-
priate strategy.
For the interpretation of the estimation results, the marginal effects of
the three main explanatory factors are calculated and presented in
Figures 3, 5, and 7. The specific estimation results of the multinomial
logistic regression models are reported in the online Appendix (see,
Tables A2–A4).
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THE RELIGIOUS-SECULAR CLEAVAGE IN GERMAN
MORALITY POLICIES
Politicization in Gay Marriage Law
Discussion of gay marriage centers around debates regarding discrimina-
tion against homosexuals. The latter topic has been on the German parlia-
mentary agenda since the 1970s, when reforms related to this issue were
first adopted. The question of same-sex partnership rights came up in
the early 1990s, when discrimination against single homosexuals was
largely abolished. In that time, the gay rights movement started to organize
itself in a more professional way and gained increased societal salience via
smaller demonstrations (Kollman 2013). Consequently, gay marriage
entered the electoral programs of small secular parties and, later, the
SPD. In the national election of 1998, all three secular parties (the SPD,
the Green Party, and the FDP) called for gay rights-related reforms in
their electoral programs. The Green Party discussed the topic most exten-
sively (Euchner 2015a) and demanded far-reaching rights for same-sex
couples, including, for instance, the formal recognition of same-sex part-
nerships and equal rights in terms of family benefits. As Figure 2 shows,
these demands were repeated in various motions and bills, resulting in
highly charged debates. In 2000 in particular, a large number of bills
and motions were proposed by all of the secular parties.
After a long bargaining process between the two coalition partners in
government, the SPD and the Green Party, the common parliamentary
FIGURE 2. Politicization of gay marriage policy across political instruments and
parties (German Bundestag, 1998–2002). Note: The first graph displays the
absolute number of politicization instruments. The second graph illustrates the
extent to which the different parties were involved in politicizing the issue.
Data source: German Bundestag.
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group joined together to submit a proposal for registered same-sex partner-
ships (Preidel 2015). It was the most permissive reform proposal, although
it refrained from addressing discrimination in terms of adoption, income
taxation or family benefits for civil services given the SPD’s still reluctant
position regarding these issues (Euchner 2015a). In a second bill, the
Liberal Party proposed a model of cohabitation for same-sex couples,
coinciding with even fewer rights and a more clear-cut separation from
the institution of marriage.
The Christian Democrats (CDU/CSU) and the PDS refrained from pro-
posing any initiative. The fact that the main religious party did not seek to
FIGURE 3. Marginal effects of the determinants of initiative behavior in gay
marriage policy. Note: Marginal effects (95%-confidence interval), calculated
on the base of the multinomial logistic regression models. Other variables are
fixed at their means. N(Total) = 667, N(Cohabitation) = 43, N(Registered
Partnership) = 343, N(None) = 281. Data source: German Bundestag.
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increase the salience of same-sex partnership rights, while secular parties
drew attention to the topic is also reflected in the estimation results of the
multinomial regression model. Figure 3a plots the marginal effects of
being a member of one of the Christian Democratic parties and initiating
any bill. In contrast to an MP of a secular party, an average Christian
Democratic deputy systematically preferred to ignore the issue (see
“none” category). In numerical terms, the analysis shows that the discrete
predicted probability of abstaining from politicizing the issue (“none” cat-
egory) increased by 95 percentage points for members of a Christian
Democratic party instead of a secular party, holding all other variables
constant at their mean. Conversely, the discrete predicted probability of
initiating a bill on registered partnership models decreased by 85 percent-
age points when changing the affiliation from a secular to a religious
party, holding all other factors constant at their mean. These results
support the argument of Engeli, Green-Pedersen, and Larsen (2012)
and, therefore, Expectations 1a and 1b.
But what happens when we examine the influence of religion in more
detail? Does the divide between members of Christian Democratic
parties and secular parties found on the traditional cleavage between
Catholics and non-Catholics and thus, on a denominational divide? The
estimated regression model indicates that being Catholic appears to be
important for the politicization strategy of single deputies, supporting
Expectations 2a and 2b. The marginal effect plot in Figure 3b shows
that deputies affiliated with the Catholic Church were more likely to
refrain from politicizing the issue via new initiatives than Protestants.
This effect was not only apparent in comparison to Protestant MPs, but
also relative to deputies that were non-affiliated to one of the Christian
churches. Holding all other factors constant at their mean, the discrete pre-
dicted probability of refraining from issue politicization increased by 34
percentage points when the religious affiliation of a MP changed from
Protestant to Catholic. Additionally, the discrete predicted probability of
opting for a registered partnership model decreased by 32 percentage
points, holding all other factors constant at their mean.
These results do not indicate that active church members are more likely
to follow this strategy than religiously inactive MPs; those results lack
clear-cut statistical significance (see Model 2 in Table A2 in the online
Appendix and the margin plots in Figure 3c). As religious engagement
often co-varies with religious denomination, we estimated an interaction
term, confirming that religious Catholics are more likely to abstain from
issue politicization than Protestants (see Model 3 in Table A2 in the
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online Appendix and Figure 3d). Religious Protestants, however, do not
behave uniformly with regard to the politicization of same-sex partnership
rights in contrast to non-religious Protestants. In other words, the religios-
ity of MPs interacts systematically only with one specific religious
denomination. Thus, the denominational divide remains a strong signi-
ficant factor that substantially impacts MPs’ politicization behavior.
Specifically, the discrete predicted probability of refraining from morality
politicization increased by 28 percentage points for a denominational
change from Protestant to Catholic. These results suggest that the party
cleavage between Christian Democratic and secular parties founds
mainly on the traditional denominational divide, while a conflict
between religious and non-religious deputies is not so much an indepen-
dent factor, but one that interacts with a specific religious denomination
(i.e., mainly with Catholicism).
Politicization in Prostitution Policy
Like gay marriage, the topic of prostitution also reached the governmental
agenda in the 14th legislative period. In previous years, the SPD and espe-
cially the Green and the PDS pressured the Christian Democratic-liberal
Kohl government to adopt comprehensive reform proposals by different
parliamentary initiatives. A key demand was to abolish the legal “immo-
rality” of prostitution, with proponents of this reform arguing that such
juridical pronouncement of immorality imposed serious disadvantages
for prostitutes, making it extremely difficult to offer sexual services
under safe conditions. Prostitutes could not be employed legally and sue
their clients for non-payment, but still had to pay taxes, thus producing
a discrepancy between societal reality and law (Euchner and Knill
2015). During the national election of 1998, all secular parties prioritized
the topic in their party manifestos and increased attention on the topic via
various bills and motions during the legislative term (see Figure 4). The
Christian Democrats were active only once: in 2001, the main religious
party submitted a motion in response to the governmental bill.
At the end of the legislative term, two bills of the secular parties made
their way onto the parliamentary agenda. The government coalition
between SPD and Greens presented the first legislative proposal, called
“Limited recognition model.” The PDS submitted a second proposal
called “Full recognition model,” which included more far-reaching
rights for prostitutes (e.g., abolishing locational restrictions and the
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prohibition of advertisement). Moreover, the PDS’s proposal subsumed
concrete suggestions regarding implementation of the policy at the
regional level. Both the Christian Democrats and the FDP refrained
from submitting any legislative initiative (see Figure 4). The regression
analysis of individual politicization behavior reflects this picture: the
main religious parties avoided to increased issue attention, while the
main secular parties followed the reverse approach. Figure 5a plots the
marginal effects of being a member of the Christian Democratic parties,
while the other factors are fixed at their mean.8 On average, Christian
Democratic MPs had a significantly higher probability of being passive,
while a member of one of the secular parties was significantly more
likely to initiate a proposal. More detailed analyses show that discrete pre-
dicted probabilities of abstaining from politicizing the issue (“none” cate-
gory) increased by 89 percentage points when changing party membership
from secular parties to a Christian Democratic party, holding all other var-
iables constant at their mean. Conversely, the same change reduces the
discrete predicted probability of demanding limited recognition for sex
workers by 85 percentage points, when holding all other factors constant
at their mean. Thus, at first glance and in accordance with Expectations 1a
and 1b, we discover a divide between Christian Democratic MPs and MPs
of secular parties in terms of issue politicization, in keeping with Engeli,
Green-Pedersen, and Larsen’s (2012) propositions.
However, how does the picture shift when we consider a more multifac-
eted concept of religion, focusing on the denominational divide and reli-
giosity? Figure 5b illustrates that the religious denomination of deputies
has a strong and significant effect on their politicization behavior. Being
FIGURE 4. Politicization of prostitution policy across political instruments and
parties (German Bundestag, 1998–2002). Note: The first graph displays the
absolute number of politicization instruments. The second graph illustrates the
extent to which the different parties were involved in politicizing the issue.
Data source: German Bundestag.
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affiliated with the Catholic Church coincided with a much higher likeli-
hood of not politicizing prostitution policy, while Protestants were more
likely to actively politicize the issue by co-sponsoring proposals for the
limited recognition of sex workers. The latter also holds for non-affiliated
MPs. The discrete predicted probability of tabling no initiatives on prosti-
tution policy (or “none”) increased by 28 percentage points when chang-
ing the religious affiliation from non-Catholic to Catholic. Finally, the
effect of religious engagement is less pronounced and not statistically sig-
nificant (see Figure 5c and Table A3 in the online Appendix).
As discussed above, religiosity often interacts with religious denomina-
tion. Also in the field of prostitution policy, the interaction term between
FIGURE 5. Marginal effects of the determinants of initiative behavior in
prostitution policy. Note: Marginal effects (95%-confidence interval),
calculated on the base of the multinomial logistic regression models. Other
variables are fixed at their means. Data source: German Bundestag.
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Catholicism and religiosity is statistically significant and negative (see
Model 3 in Table A3 in the online Appendix). Thus, religious Catholics
were more likely to ignore the issue of prostitution policy compared to
Protestants. The discrete predicted probability of non-politicization
increased by 28 percentage points for members of the Catholic Church
who are religious, holding all other factors constant. However, the religi-
osity of Protestant MPs failed to interact systematically with parliamentary
behavior. As a result, Catholic denomination appears to have a systematic
effect on the politicization strategies of single deputies, supporting
Expectations 2a and 2b. These results indicate that the party cleavage in
morality politics between Christian Democrats and deputies of secular
parties founds mainly on the traditional divide between Catholics and
non-Catholics, while religiosity is a secondary factor interacting positively
only with Catholicism.
Politicization in Embryonic Protection Policy
The issue of embryonic protection came on the parliamentary agenda
during the 14th legislative period of the German Bundestag in reaction
to new developments in biomedical research (Nebel 2015). On the one
hand, a research team successfully extracted embryonic stem cells from
a blastocyst, opening new possibilities to use these cells for research and
medical treatment. On the other hand, new diagnostic methods were devel-
oped for checking the genetic disposition of embryos before implantation.
In Germany, the Embryonenschutzgesetz (Embryonic Protection Act) of
1990 prohibited both techniques (Rothmayr and Ramjoué 2004). Due to
increasing societal demand for policy change, the issue soon turned up
on the political agenda. Figure 6 illustrates the politicization of embryonic
protection policy across political instruments (bills and motions) and
parties between 1998 and 2002. In line with the expectations of Engeli,
Green-Pedersen, and Larsen (2012), secular parties put this issue on the
agenda. Interestingly, however, it was primarily smaller parties that were
the driving forces of the debate, while the major parties struggled with
intra-party heterogeneity and thus remained relatively passive in promoting
common motions or bills on the issue (Rothmayr and Ramjoué 2004).
Although the issue touched traditional Christian values concerning the
sanctity of life, MPs within neither the social-green government nor the
single catch-all parties — SPD and CDU/CSU — were able to agree on
a common position. While the discussion on pre-genetic diagnosis
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fizzled out, the debate on the usage of embryonic stem cells in biomedi-
cine was framed as an issue of conscience, involving the suspension of
party lines and the elaboration of policy proposals across parties. In that
stage, some Christian Democratic MPs abandoned their strategy of passiv-
ity and were actively involved in politicizing the topic via bills. In total,
three bills were proposed. While one group proposed to keep the status
quo of prohibition, a second coalition of MPs suggested the import of
cell lines for research purposes. The third proposal defended a compro-
mise solution, permitting the import of stem cells according to strict con-
ditions. The primary requirement was compliance to a key date of January
2002 — specifically, the embryo had to be produced abroad prior to this
date (Nebel 2015).
In sum, a clear divide between MPs of Christian Democratic and secular
parties is absent in the politicization of embryonic stem cell research in
Germany. The regression analysis of individual co-sponsorship behavior
illustrates this in more detail. Figure 7a provides a graphical interpretation
of these results and plots the marginal effects of being a member of
Christian Democratic parties on the (non-)sponsorship of one of the initia-
tives. Christian Democratic MPs did not remain inactive. In fact, they had
a significantly higher probability of politicizing the topic. Many Christian
Democratic MPs co-sponsored a bill that demands the total prohibition of
embryonic stem cell research. Changing from a secular party to one of the
religious parties even decreased the discrete predicted probability of the
“none” option by 4 percentage points. It means, Christian Democratic
MPs had a slightly higher probability to proposal a bill and hence, to polit-
icize the issue. These findings contradict Expectation 1a.
FIGURE 6. Politicization of embryonic protection policy across political
instruments and parties (German Bundestag, 1998–2002). Note: The first graph
displays the absolute number of politicization instruments. The second graph
illustrates the extent to which the different parties were involved in politicizing
the issue. Data source: German Bundestag.
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These insights raise questions about the underlying religious fundament
of the cleavage between religious and secular party members. Which reli-
gious aspects drive individual politicization behavior? The results of the
two multinomial regression models, presented in the marginal effects
plots in Figure 7b and 7c, shed light on this question.9 The model indi-
cates that Catholicism is the dividing force of the engagement of
Christian Democratic party members and religiosity turns out to be an
additional dimension.
Figure 7b shows that Catholics are more likely to advocate for the pro-
tection of the unborn life. Therefore, the main divide is between Catholics
FIGURE 7. Marginal effects of the determinants of initiative behavior in
embryonic protection policy. Note: Marginal effects (95%-confidence interval),
calculated on the base of the multinomial logistic regression models. Other
variables are fixed at their means. N(Total) = 664, N(Prohibition) = 232, N
(Import with key date) = 188, N(Import) = 86, N(None) = 158. Data source:
German Bundestag.
Religious-Secular Party Cleavage in German Morality Politics 241
use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1755048317000694
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. UB der LMU München, on 06 Sep 2019 at 07:20:02, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of
and non-Catholics, supporting only Expectation 2b. An additional finding
is that Protestant MPs are active but propose more permissive bills than
Catholic MPs. The divide between religiously engaged and non-engaged
MPs is less pronounced, as Figure 7c shows, but we also observe signifi-
cant distinctions that contradict Expectations 3a and 3b. While active
church members tend to co-sponsor any of the proposals, non-engaged
MPs tend to refrain from drawing attention to the issue. In contrast
to the previous analyses, however, religiosity does not interact systemati-
cally with Catholicism (see Figure 7d and Model 3 in Table A4 in the
online Appendix). Religious Catholics do not behave differently than
Protestants and religious Protestants do not behave differently than non-
religious Protestants.10
In sum, the suspension of party discipline during the policy formulation
process of morality issues stimulates a different parliamentary behavior of
MPs belonging to secular or religious political parties. As soon as party
discipline is suspended and collective party strategies no longer structure
parliamentary behavior, several Christian Democrats cease to follow the
strategy of not politicizing morality issues. Instead, they — and Catholic
MPs in particular — actively lobby for restrictive regulation by formulat-
ing corresponding initiatives. However, this behavior is not systematically
related with the level of religiosity of Catholic MPs. It means that religious
MPs and particularly religious Catholics are not systematically more
active or passive with regard to the politicization of morality issues.
Consequently, only when party competition is in working order, secular
parties and their members are able to play off religious counterparts by
an issue competition logic that integrates policy-, vote-, and office-
seeking aims.
CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION
This study examines whether parliamentary party competition on morality
policies in Germany aligns with the cleavage between Christian
Democratic and secular parties. We rely on the idea of issue competition
and assume that party competition in parliament can be accessed through
the examination of politicization patterns of individual MPs (i.e., number
and type of suggested motions and bills). In doing so, we seek to open the
“black box” of political parties — regularly seen as monolith collective
actors — and explore the religious-secular party cleavage in the German
parliament from a new, micro-level perspective.
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Our findings reveal that the conflict between Christian Democratic and
secular parties is still grounded in the historical divide between Catholic
and non-Catholics across all three explored morality policies. Catholics
are less engaged in the agenda-setting stage. Only under the suspension
of party discipline, Catholics are likely to take a public stance on morality
policies. These initiatives suggest, however, rather restrictive policy solu-
tions. Moreover, the religiosity of MPs shapes politicization patterns,
though less so than does Catholicism. Only in two out of three morality
policies, the religiosity of MPs seems to shape politicization behavior of
MPs (for a summary of all results see Table 1). Moreover, a more detailed
analysis shows that religiosity interacts positively with Catholicism only
with regard to two morality policies (same-sex partnership rights and pros-
titution policy). This suggests that religious Catholics have an increased
predicted probability of not politicizing morality policies compared to
secular non-Catholics. The religiosity of Protestant MPs does not system-
atically influence their politicization behavior — even when party disci-
pline is dissolved. Hence, Protestant MPs (even if they are religious)
stand somewhere in between value-conservative Catholics and liberal,
non-affiliated MPs. This finding might be the product of comparably
vague policy positions of the Protestant Church in Germany and less hier-
archical structures, which offer room of interpretation for their members.
By investigating religious-secular party cleavages in the parliamentary
arena from a micro-level perspective and focusing on the concept of
issue competition, we demonstrate the value of examining political
parties not as unitary actors but as groups of individual MPs with
diverse personal characteristics. Specifically, electoral studies on the












1. Religious vs secular party
member
(+) + + −
2. Catholic vs non-Catholic + + (+) +
3. Religious engaged vs non-
religious
± (+) − (+)
Source: Own compilation. + = full support; (+) = limited support; ± = mixed evidence; − = no
support.
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transformation of the religious cleavage find that the traditional denomina-
tional divide has decreased salience and that the distinction between the
religious and non-religious is increasingly relevant, yet these claims do
not hold for the parliamentary arena in the German context. Our findings
suggest that the described changes of Christian Democracy throughout
Europe have not provoked pronounced changes in the societal foundations
of the party conflict; instead, the denominational divide is still relevant —
at least in Germany. Still, it should be noted that Catholicism itself is
undergoing change, as more and more people question traditional creeds
and accept more heterogeneity (Willems 2007).
This study highlights several opportunities for future research. First, the
analysis of party competition in the German Bundestag does involve some
particularities, such as the existence of two equally strong churches,
restricting the generalization of results. Therefore, we suggest re-evaluat-
ing our hypotheses in additional countries with two or more religious
denominations (e.g., the Netherlands or Switzerland), with different reli-
gious denominations (e.g., Orthodox, Evangelicals), as well as in
single-religion countries. Moreover, it is Germany’s specific multi-party
system and the large size of the two mass parties that makes the politici-
zation of morality issues a challenge; in other countries, minor religious
parties can actually strengthen their profile by politicizing morality
issues (Timmermans and Breeman 2012). Future research could investi-
gate how highly fragmented party systems with many small parties
(e.g., Denmark, Belgium) deal with similar issues. Second, it would be
interesting to apply this micro-level approach of religious-secular cleav-
ages to other issues related with religious values, such as family policy,
religious education, or immigration policy. This, in addition to a longer
time horizon, would be a valid and creative way to explore the relative
stability versus change of the religious-secular cleavage among political
elites against the backdrop of secularization.
NOTES
1. Many countries around the world are experiencing decreased levels of religiosity (Fox 2015).
However, in some countries such as the United States, religion does not lose relevance but instead
drives increased polarization among political forces (Layman and Weaver 2016).
2. The terms “morality policies” and “value-loaded policies” are used interchangeably.
3. In contrast to the traditional party competition literature, Budge and Farlie (1983) argue that
political parties compete not only in terms of specific issue positions, but also in terms of how
issues are politicized and/or emphasized. The idea of issue competition is the center of the
Comparative Party Manifesto Project that was subsequently initiated by Budge and Farlies. The
project compiles an enormous dataset that captures the relative salience of different issues across
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party manifestos. This further suggests that the scholars are mainly interested in the attention political
parties dedicate to certain issues, whereas parties’ specific issue positions are secondary.
4. In line with Engeli, Green-Pedersen, and Larsen (2012), we assume that morality policies
provoke party conflicts because the German party system developed along a religious-secular conflict
line within German society, which can, therefore, be classified as part of the “religious world.”
5. The study proposes parallel causal paths for the macro- and micro-levels. It means, at the macro-
level, we expect a positive relationship between a religious-secular party cleavage and the parliamen-
tary salience of morality policies. At the micro-level, we expect that certain religious values of MPs
shape the co-sponsorship of legislative bills and, hence, the general salience of morality policies.
However, in contrast to Coleman (2000), we do not aim to explore the two causal mechanisms that
link the macro- and micro-level.
6. One might discuss whether the number of initiated bills (respectively the fact of initiation) is an
appropriate indicator to assess issue politicization because about 35 MPs are required to propose a bill
in the German Bundestag (at least 5% of all MPs). As a result, the MP is not independent in his/her
decision to politicize an issue. On the other hand, many studies use the same indicator to measure issue
politicization or rely on indicators having the same deficit (e.g., motions, party manifestos). Moreover,
bills provoke larger public and political attention because they are presented in one plenary session and
discussed in another plenary session in Germany. Written questions, for instance, can be proposed
independently from the support of other MPs but they coincide with much lower levels of issue atten-
tion and hence, can also be questioned in terms of their appropriateness for assessing issue politiciza-
tion. Finally, the inclusion of a morality issues (embryonic stem cell research) for which party
discipline was abandoned in the initiation stage allows to control for any unintended effect caused
by the selection of parliamentary instruments.
7. If one of the prominent policy paradigms (e.g., “same-sex marriage” or “abolitionism”) is not
considered in any of the bills, then the bills are not part of the analysis.
8. Table A3 in the online Appendix depicts the result of the regression analysis.
9. Table A4 in the online Appendix depicts the result of the regression analysis.
10. When estimating an additional model with an interaction term between party affiliation and
Catholicism, we observe an increased and significant probability of Catholics being member of the
CDU to opt for a prohibition model compared to Catholics being member in any other party or com-
pared to non-Catholics.
SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIALS
To view supplementary material for this article, please visit https://doi.org/
10.1017/S1755048317000694.
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